ANALYSIS OF PNEUMATICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

For the use of STUDENTS in the College of EDINBURGH.

EDINBURGH:
Printed in the year MDCCLXVI.
Sold by A. KINCAID & J. BELL.
Price Sixpence.

1568 | 5439.

ANALYSIS

OF

Pneumatics and Moral Philoſophy.

INTRODUCTION.

1.

SCIENCE may be conſidered either as it is an attainment of the mind; as it refers to a particular ſubject; or as it tends to a particular object or end.

Conſidered as an attainment of the mind, Science is diſtinguiſhed from Hiſtory and Art.

Hiſtory is the knowledge of particulars in detail.

Science is the knowledge of general principles.

Art is a power founded on knowledge or habit, by which men perform certain functions of mind, or operate on ſome external ſubject.

2.

Science conſidered with a view to its ſubject, is either Abſtract or Applicate.

Abſtract Science refers to the proceedings of reaſon on the mere ſuppoſitions of *entity*, *quantity*, or *number*; as in *Metaphyſics*, *Geometry*, and *Arithmetic*.

Applicate Science refers to ſome particular ſubject; as, *Mind*, or *Matter*; *Underſtanding*, or *Sentiment*; *Bodies*, *hard*, *ſoft*, or *elaſtic*.

The applicate Sciences may be divided into two capital branches. That which refers to the Material Syſtem, and that which refers to the Intellectual.

3.

3.

Science conſidered with a view to its object is of two kinds; Phyſical, and Moral.

Phyſical Science is the knowledge of what is.

Moral Science is the knowledge of what ought to be *.

A principle in Phyſical Science is ſome known fact, ſerving to account for a variety of appearances, conſidered as its effects or conſequences.

A principle in Moral Science is ſome perception of good or evil, ſerving to direct the choice in a variety of inſtances.

The general expreſſion of a principle conſtitutes a law in phyſics or morality.

A Law, in the Phyſical ſenſe, is any general expreſſion of what is.

In the Moral ſenſe it is an expreſſion of what ought to be.

* The terms *ought to be* are relative to human apprehenſion.

The ſame ſubject may be treated Morally or Phyſically.

Human Nature treated Phyſically is in part the ſubject of Pneumatics.

Treated Morally is the ſubject of Moral Philoſophy.

Of

Of PNEUMATICS.

PNEUMATICS, conſiſting of two parts, treat phyſically of Mind or Spirit.

The firſt part treats of the Human Mind.

The ſecond of the Being and Attributes of GOD.

Human Nature is Animal and Intellectual.

The Animal nature of man is the ſubject of Anatomy and Phyſiology. The Intellectual nature is the proper ſubject of Pneumatics: but being joined, many of their functions are mixed, and pertain equally to Pneumatics and to Phyſiology.

Of

PART

PART I.

Of HUMAN NATURE.

CHAPTER I.

The Hiſtory of the SPECIES.

1.

MANKIND have ſome qualities in common with the other animals; ſome that diſtinguiſh them; and others by which they are themſelves diverſified.

2.

Like the other animals, they are generated and nouriſhed, they have their period of life, and are ſubject to diſſolution.

3.

Half the numbers that are born die, according to ſome obſervations, before the ſeventh year is expired; according to others, before the third.

Long life conſiſts of between ſeventy and one hundred years.

It appears from the annual regiſter of deaths, where the numbers of people are known, that one of thirty-two dies in each year.

The infancy of man, or his ſtate of dependence on the parent, continues longer, and his inſtincts are more fallible than they are in the young of any other ſpecies.

When adult, he ſupplies many apparent defects from invention.

His ingenuity enables him to ſubſiſt in a variety of ſituations and climates.

He is an animal of prey; aſſociating and political; and has a ſuperiority over every other ſpecies.

He is qualified to diſcourſe, and com-

communicates his meaning by a variety of fixed and arbitrary ſigns.

He diſtinguiſhes characters by epithets of praiſe or blame. He loves or hates, he admires or contemns.

The ſpecies ſeparates into bands and companies; but the individual, ſeldom from choice, is found to ſubſiſt alone.

4.

Varieties in human nature are either ſuch as diſtinguiſh different races of men, different ages of the ſame race, or individuals of the ſame race and age.

Races are diſtinguiſhed by their features, ſtature, complexion, diſpoſitions, and faculties.

They are reducible to ſix:

The European, *the Samoiede*, *the Tartar*, *the Indian*, *the Negro*, and *the American* *.

* Some diverſities of the race appear to be connected with ſituation and climate.

5.

5.

Different ages of the ſame race are diſtinguiſhed by the unequal poſſeſſion of commercial, literary, and political arts.

Ages are ſaid to be ſavage, barbarous, or poliſhed.

During the firſt, men live on terms of equality, without property or government.

During the ſecond, they are diſtinguiſhed by inequalities of birth and fortune, aſſociate in tribes, and follow their leaders.

During the third, they find additional grounds of diſtinction, in a diverſity of education, profeſſion, and manner of life. They are governed by magiſtrates, hereditary or elective, under the direction of laws and eſtabliſhed forms.

6.

Individuals of the ſame race are diſtinguiſhed by a difference of aſpect, capacity, diſpoſition, and force.

Theſe varieties qualify members of the ſame ſociety for different ſtations, and render ſubordination conſiſtent with natural equality.

7.

Every ſtate in which man can employ his talents, and follow his diſpoſitions, is a ſtate of nature.

CHAP. II.

Of the Hiſtory of the INDIVIDUAL.

SECTION I.

Of the UNDERSTANDING.

THE Individual is conſcious of his perſonal identity, in the performance of many functions, either merely animal, intellectual, or mixed.

Conſciouſneſs is a principal attribute of mind; and is that by which it may be ſaid to exiſt for itſelf.

Merely animal functions are thoſe in which bodily organs and mere animal powers are exerted; as, digeſtion, circulation, *&c.*

Intellectual functions are ſuch as cannot be referred to any bodily organ; as thought, judgement, and deſire.

Mixed functions are the proceedings of mind referred to bodily organs; as, ſenſation, and appetite.

2.

The mixed or intellectual functions of this active being, however otherwiſe diſtinguiſhed, terminate in either of two ends; the diſcovery of truth, or the attainment of good.

Truth is the relation of our belief or opinion to the reality of things.

Good is a quality of ſentiment, and can exiſt only in a ſentient nature.

Truth is the object of underſtanding. Good is the object of will.

3.

Underſtanding includes obſervation, memory, imagination, arrangement, and foreſight.

Obſervation is that proceeding of the mind by which we collect facts.

Facts

Facts relate to the exiſting qualities and operations of different natures.

Obſervation terminates in hiſtory, or the knowledge of particulars in detail.

Hiſtory is either deſcriptive or narrative.

Deſcriptive hiſtory is the detail of co-exiſtent circumſtances and qualities.

Narrative hiſtory is the detail of ſucceſſive events.

We are determined by a law of our nature to believe facts to which we ourſelves are witneſſes, or to which we have the credible teſtimony of others.

4.

Memory is that proceeding of mind in which ſubjects paſt are recalled.

Its operations are either caſual or intentional.

Memory is caſual when objects ſuggeſt each other in ſome order they hold, independent of choice or intention.

Memory is intentional when the mind from deſign recollects any object.

5.

Imagination is the ſtating objects as preſent under a ſenſe of their abſence, or as real under a ſenſe of their being fictitious.

Deſign, invention, deſcription, and paſſion, or deſire, depend on imagination.

6.

Arrangement is the diſpoſing of facts agreeably to the connection or relation they have in nature.

The principal articles of relation are thoſe of ſimilitude, contiguity, cauſe and effect.

From the relation of ſimilitude, objects in deſcriptive hiſtory are claſſed into *genera* and *ſpecies*.

From that of contiguity of time or place they are ranged in narration.

From

From that of cauſe and effect they are connected in theory.

Theory is the arrangement of ſeparate appearances under ſome common principle.

Syſtem is the combination of theories for mutual illuſtration and ſupport.

Science conſiſts in juſt theory and ſyſtem.

7.

Foreſight is the faculty of conjecturing what is to follow from the paſt or the preſent.

It requires penetration and ſagacity; penetration to comprehend the circumſtances of any particular caſe, and ſagacity to perceive what is likely to follow from thoſe circumſtances.

Penetration and ſagacity are the foundations of art and ſkill.

SECT. II.

Of the WILL.

THE will includes Sentiment, Inclination, and Volition.

I.

Sentiment is the perception and the enjoyment of Good, or the perception and the ſuffering of Ill.

The object of Sentiment is that to which it is referred as to its Cauſe.

Thus Provocation is the object of Anger, and Danger of Fear.

Objects are ſaid to be good or evil on account of their connection with Sentiment.

This connection is in a great meaſure arbitrary.

One perſon is calm under a provocation by which another is enraged; or fearleſs in danger by which another is terrified.

There

There are four kinds of enjoyment or ſuffering; *viz.*

1. Senſations of Pleaſure or Pain.
2. Approbation or Diſlike.
3. Affection or Hatred.
4. Exerciſe or Languor.

The firſt pertains to our Animal and Senſitive being.

The others to our Intellectual and Active nature.

Senſations are pleaſant or painful apart from our knowledge of their cauſe; as in the caſe of flavours, odours, *&c.*

Judgements of approbation or diſlike are pleaſant or painful from a knowledge and diſcernment of their object; as in diſtinguiſhing what is beautiful or deformed, great or mean.

Affection is pleaſant by the delight it borrows from the welfare or good of its object; as in Friendſhip and Love.

Hatred is the reverſe.

Exerciſes are pleaſant or painful, in being more or leſs fitted to our capacity and diſpoſitions.

2.

Inclination is a diſpoſition of our nature to act.

Every inclination may be conſidered, either in reſpect to itſelf, to its end, or to its object.

In reſpect to itſelf, Inclination is of three kinds.

1. A propenſity; 2. A deſire; or, 3. A mixture of both.

A Propenſity is an original or acquired diſpoſition of our nature, operating independent of reflection or deſign.

Deſire is the intentional act of the mind, directed by the apprehenſion of a ſuppoſed good.

Nature and habit give propenſities; information or fancy may excite deſire.

Propenſities, after experience of their gratification, partake in the nature of Deſire; and Deſires, by habit, partake in the nature of Propenſities.

The ſubject of Inclination is the end or ſuppoſed good to which it refers; as,

as, when we deſire *Animal Enjoyments*, *Intellectual Talents*, or *Moral Qualities*.

The object of Inclination is the perſon to whoſe enjoyment the ſuppoſed good is referred; as in the caſe of advantages deſired for ourſelves or others.

In this reſpect inclinations are ſelfiſh or benevolent.

The mind is differently affected by paſſion as the ſubject of inclination is differently ſituated.

Paſſions are of four principal kinds:

Joy and Grief;

Hope and Fear.

A good obtained is matter of Joy; miſſed, is a ſubject of Grief. A favourable proſpect is the foundation of Hope; the reverſe is the foundation of Fear.

Paſſion is greatly diverſified in the caſe of different ſubjects and objects.

The joy or hope of the intereſted and ſelfiſh tend to Inſolence or Vanity; his grief and fear to Dejection and Cowardice;

Cowardice; and in caſe of competition with his fellow-creatures, to Envy, Malice, and Jealouſy.

The joy and hope of the benevolent are candid and juſt; his grief or fear are mixed with ſatisfaction, or loſe their effect in the ardour of his principal diſpoſition.

A *right uſe of the underſtanding, and good intentions*, being always equally in our reach, Moral Qualities may be ſtudied without any variety of paſſion. But they who commit themſelves to the direction of caſual opinions are ſubject to a variety of paſſion on this ſubject. Their joys and hopes are Self-approbation and Confidence; their griefs and fears are Shame, Indignation, and Remorſe.

3.

Volition is the determination of the mind to follow an Inclination.

Volition founded on ſentiment and inclination conſtitutes an Action.

Every

Every Action has a motive. Every Voluntary Action is free. Every Free Action is an indication of character.

It is a privilege of the mind to contemplate itſelf; to chuſe among its inclinations and ſentiments; to ſuppreſs what is evil, and cultivate what is good.

CHAP. III.

General Inferences.

1.

Capacity and parts refer to the Underſtanding; ardour and force to the Heart; both united conſtitute a natural ſuperiority of character.

Vehement inclinations are the ſource of activity and ſteadineſs; but extreme paſſion of hope or fear, joy or grief, interrupt or miſguide our conduct.

2.

2.

The properties of mind have no analogy to thoſe of matter.

They preſent exiſtences of a different and oppoſite nature.

Diviſibility is implied in every conception of matter:

Indiviſibility in every ſenſe mind has of itſelf.

What are called faculties of mind accordingly are not diſtinct parts of a complicated nature, but ſeparate names given to different acts of the ſame being.

3.

Annihilation is unknown in the order of nature; and mind, not being ſubject to a diſſolution of parts, is phyſically immortal.

PART

PART II.

Of the BEING and ATTRIBUTES of GOD.

CHAP. I.

Of the Exiſtence of GOD.

WE believe the exiſtence of mind, as we do that of matter, in conſequence of certain appearances with which that belief is connected in the frame of our nature.

To form an argument in proof of the exiſtence of mind, is to collect ſuch appearances.

The appearances, when known or obſerved, are always connected with belief.

The actions and conduct of men make known their intentions and characters.

The order and proceedings of nature make known the exiſtence and attributes of God.

CHAP. II.

Of the Attributes and Government of GOD.

THE attributes of God may be expreſſed in the terms, Power, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Juſtice.

By his power all effects are produced; by his wiſdom, his goodneſs, and his juſtice, they are infallibly directed to the beſt ends.

The belief of the exiſtence of God is founded on the appearances of providence, and implies the belief of his government.

As the Material World is governed by the intervention of phyſical inſtruments, to which we give the names of *Gravitation*, *Coheſion*, *Elaſticity*, &c. The Intellectual World is governed by moral inducements, ſenſations of pleaſure or pain, judgements of approbation or diſlike, affections of love or of hatred.

CHAP. III.

General Inferences.

1.

MAN being inclined to admire, to love, and obey proper objects, it follows that religion is natural.

The expreſſions of religion are fixed or arbitrary.

Its fixed expreſſions are thoſe actions which concur with the providence of God in promoting the good of his creatures.

Its arbitrary expreſſions are the different ceremonies, and inſtitutional obſervances, by which like ſentiments of veneration may be expreſſed in different ages or countries.

2.

Men are charged only with the care of chuſing what is good, and of doing what is right.

Events are reſerved to God.

3.

The beneficence and the juſtice of God appearing in the order of his preſent government, lead us to believe a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments.

MORAL

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY treats of Good and Evil.

Any general expreſſion of what is good is a law in Morality, and carries an obligation to determine the choice of any ſentient and intellectual being to which it refers.

The laws of Morality, relatively to man, refer either to his Mind or to his External Condition and Conduct. And Moral Philoſophy conſiſts of two parts.

The firſt relates to the mind and happineſs of Man.

The ſecond to his external condition and conduct, or to the relations and duties of men in civil life.

PART I.

Of the MIND and HAPPINESS of MAN.

CHAP. I.

Of PLEASURE.

GOOD, relatively to the human mind, is expreſſed in a variety of terms; ſuch as, *Pleaſure*, *Virtue*, and *Happineſs*.

Pleaſure is good, phyſically conſidered, without any reference to its kind, meaſure, or comparative importance.

The following are phyſical laws of our nature, relative to pleaſure and pain.

1.

The uſe of things ſalutary and requiſite to animal preſervation, is pleaſant; what is pernicious, is painful.

2.

The ſenſe of any perfection is pleaſant; of any defect, is painful.

3.

Affection is pleaſant; Hatred is painful.

4.

Hope and Joy are pleaſant; Grief and Fear are painful. But theſe paſſions, grafted on affection or hatred, partake greatly in the nature of the diſpoſition from which they ariſe.

5.

5.

Exercise of the mind or body is pleasant.

6.

Habit, in some instances, can change the source of our pleasures or pains.

CHAP. II.

Of VIRTUE.

1.

VIRTUE is *good*, considered as the excellence of man's nature, and what renders him the object of esteem and of praise.

Man is by nature the member of a community. His love of that community renders him a good member of it, and intitles him to praise.

Virtue is that qualification of soul which

which fits the individual to procure the good of mankind.

The requiſites to virtue are, Diſpoſition, Skill, Application, and Force.

Hence Virtue has been divided into four branches, correſponding to the number of theſe requiſites; *viz.*

Juſtice, Prudence,
Temperance, and Fortitude.

Juſtice is a diſpoſition of the mind favourable to the rights and welfare of mankind.

Prudence is the ſkill and ſagacity with which men chuſe their ends, and the proper means to obtain them.

Temperance is the power to abſtain from the purſuit of enjoyments that recal from the more important engagements of human life.

Fortitude is the power to withſtand oppoſition, difficulty, and danger.

2.

Virtue is approved of from a principle of regard to mankind; or from an

an original diſpoſition of our nature, leading us to place our excellence in qualifications proper to a ſocial and active being.

This principle has, by men of ſpeculation, been differently named, and differently claſſed, with the proceedings of the underſtanding, or with thoſe of the heart. In common language it is termed *Reaſon*, or *Conſcience*.

CHAP. III.

Of HAPPINESS.

HAPPINESS, whether denominated by the names of *Pleaſure*, or of *Virtue*, is to every ſentient being his ſtate of leaſt ſuffering and greateſt enjoyment.

Of neceſſary pains the leaſt is to be choſen; and of incompatible pleaſures, the greateſt.

Continual fear is a greater pain than any

any misfortune. Courage therefore is a principal requiſite to happineſs.

The pleaſures of ſenſe are mean and tranſient, compared to thoſe of affection and of conduct.

It is happineſs to be free from fear and diſguſt, from envy and jealouſy; to entertain the beſt affections, Humanity, Friendſhip, and Love; that is, to be engaged in the purſuit of the beſt object, the good of mankind.

The excellence of man, his greateſt pleaſure, and his happineſs, are the ſame.

The choice of names, of however little apparent effect in philoſophy, leads ſometimes to the moſt important conſequences.

The ſects that expreſſed happineſs under the name of *Pleaſure*, were led to prefer eaſe, animal enjoyment, and ſloth.

They who expreſſed it by the name of *Virtue*, preferred activity, courage, and the higher enjoyments of the heart.

The

The enjoyments of the voluptuous terminate in ſenſuality, becauſe attention to mere pleaſure, if not defeated by temper, precludes admiration, affection, and exertion of mind.

Senſuality terminates in languor and ſloth.

Where pleaſures of the mind and the heart are moſt ſenſibly felt, the external marks of enjoyment are, Activity, Beneficence, and Courage.

PART

PART II.

Of the laws of Morality relatively to EXTERNAL CONDITIONS and CONDUCT.

GENERAL DIVISION.

EXTERNAL condition and conduct have a reference to individuals, or to collective bodies.

The condition and conduct of individuals are the ſubjects of Ethics.

The condition and conduct of collective bodies are the ſubjects of Politics.

CHAP. I.

Of ETHICS.

ETHICS conſiſt of two parts; Caſuiſtry, and Juriſprudence.

Sect. I.

Of Casuistry.

1.

Casuistry treats of the ſtations, manners, and duties of men.

2.

Under the head of ſtation are included fortune and rank.

Fortune implies property; and refers to the unequal meaſure of things, tending to animal enjoyment and ſafety.

The uſes of fortune are ſubſiſtence and beneficence. Unequal fortune may be equally well or ill employed; and is connected with happineſs or miſery, ſo far as it gives occaſion to conduct, and is the ſubject of opinion and fancy.

Rank is the ſtation of the individual relatively to other men.

A rank is conſtituted by fortune, birth, and character.

Fortune

Fortune derives rank from the opinion and dependence of others.

Birth derives rank from the luſtre of anceſtors.

Character is the ground of eſtimation, and may raiſe or ſink men to the rank in which they are qualified to act.

Good conduct and happineſs are not peculiar to any ſtation.

3.

Manners are the external expreſſion of a character that ſubſiſts in the mind and the heart.

Like other external ſigns of diſpoſition and meaning, manners have either an arbitrary or a natural connection with the diſpoſition ſignified.

Manners of the firſt kind depend merely on cuſtom; and fluctuate, like language, or any other arbitrary inſtitution.

Manners of the ſecond kind are ſuch appearances and conduct as men of certain diſpoſitions naturally aſſume.

Manners founded in nature are ſometimes varied by cuſtom, inſomuch that different nations or ages require a different aſpect, carriage, and conduct, in expreſſion of the ſame diſpoſition.

A conduct tending to the good of mankind is invariably right, independent of opinion or cuſtom.

Even in caſe of arbitrary manners, we are bound, when the good of mankind will permit, to obſerve thoſe of our country, as we ſpeak its language, or wear its dreſs.

4.

Duties may be conſidered as terminating either in the perſon acting, and are decent or proper; or as having influence on others, and are beneficent or innocent.

Decency of conduct is its agreeableneſs to the opinion of others.

Propriety of conduct is its ſuitableneſs to our nature, ſtation, and fortune.

In-

Innocence is the conſiſtency of our conduct with the welfare of others.

Beneficence is its tendency to promote that welfare.

The eſtabliſhment of general rules relating to duties is a principal object of caſuiſtry. But the beſt directory in human life is the diſpoſition from which thoſe duties proceed.

SECT. II.

Of JURISPRUDENCE.

1.

JURISPRUDENCE treats of the conduct of men in its reference to the rights of others.

It conſiſts of two parts. The firſt relates to the manner in which the rights of men are conſtituted.

The ſecond, to the manner in which thoſe rights may be vindicated.

2.

The apprehenſion of a right is founded in the deſire of every ſenſitive being to preſerve and to defend himſelf.

The rights of men are conſtituted either in the perſon or in things, and are ſaid to be perſonal or real.

Perſonal rights include ſafety, freedom, and the uſe of talents.

Real rights include commonty, poſſeſſion, property, and ſervice.

Rights are conſtituted by the original appointment of nature, or the ſubſequent proceedings of men; and are original or adventitious.

Safety, freedom, the uſe of talents, poſſeſſion, and commonty, are original rights.

Property and ſervice are adventitious.

3.

Property is an excluſive right to the uſe of things.

Of things, ſome are not ſubjects of property; others pertain to communities; and others to individuals.

4.

Service is a right to the aid and attendance of others.

5.

5.

Adventitious rights ariſe from contract, occupancy, labour, or forfeiture.

Contracts are conſtituted by promiſe and acceptance.

Contracts are binding, becauſe to raiſe and to fruſtrate an expectation is an injury.

They do not bind in favour of a party that has failed on his part, or in caſe of a condition that has not taken place.

They are rendered void by the exceptions of force, fraud, or injuſtice.

Occupancy conſiſts in the prior and continued uſe of a ſubject.

Forfeiture refers to a right acquired in reparation of a damage ſuſtained.

6.

Property may be acquired by occupancy and labour. It may be transferred by contract or forfeiture.

The will of a deceaſed proprietor does not convey a right of property.

A right to ſervice is acquired by contract or forfeiture.

No right to ſervice can amount to property in the perſon of the ſervant: ſlavery therefore has no foundation in juſtice.

7.

The rights of men may be maintained by perſuaſion, ſtratagem, or force.

Parties may act either as principals or auxiliaries in maintaining a right.

Stratagem and force are lawful:

1*ſt*, Where parties have not ſtipulated, as in civil ſociety, to ſubmit their differences.

2*dly*, Where an aid ſtipulated cannot be obtained.

3*dly*, Where milder methods actually have failed, or are not likely to ſucceed.

8.

The condition in which parties are reduced

reduced to the uſe of ſtratagem and force, is the ſtate of war.

The laws of war are,

1. A wrong apprehended may be prevented by ſtratagem or force.

2. An aſſault may be repelled.

3. A damage ſuſtained gives a right to reparation.

4. Reparation is in juſtice proportioned to the damage ſuſtained.

CHAP. II.

Of POLITICS.

GENERAL DIVISION.

POLITICS treat of nations and collective bodies.

A nation is any company or ſociety of men acting by concert, or under a common direction.

The united force and direction of numbers is termed *the State*.

States

States may be conſidered with a view to their reſources, or to their form.

The firſt is the ſubject of public œconomy.

The ſecond, of government.

SECT. I.

Of PUBLIC OECONOMY.

1.

PUBLIC OECONOMY refers to national wealth and revenue.

Nations are rich by poſſeſſing in abundance the means of ſubſiſtence, or what may be exchanged for ſuch means.

Riches depend on the poſſeſſion of lands, materials, induſtry, ſkill, and numbers of people.

2.

Nations acquire land or territory by conqueſt, caſual coalitions, or colonies.

3.

3.

They diſcover materials by continued obſervation and trials.

4.

They become induſtrious by a habit grafted on the ſenſe of utility and ſafety.

5.

They become ſkilful by continued application, and by ſubdividing arts and profeſſions.

Commerce being the exchange of commodities, is neceſſary to the ſubdiviſion of arts.

Commerce conſiſts of barter, or of purchaſe and ſale.

Purchaſe and ſale requires a mode of valuation, and the uſe of money.

Money is a commodity of univerſal demand, taken in exchange for any other commodity.

Money

Money in coin is this commodity divided into parts of a fixed quantity, and received in tale on the faith of a ſtamp applied by the public.

The moſt convenient commodities for the purpoſes of coin are the precious metals.

Bills are obligations to pay a ſpecified value in money.

Commerce may redound to the profit of all parties concerned, by enabling each to improve his peculiar material, or to purſue his peculiar art.

That party gains moſt by commerce who receives the more uſeful commodity, and who, to carry on his trade, is employed in the more healthy and leaſt corrupting occupations.

6.

Nations become populous in proportion to the means of ſubſiſtence they offer and ſecure to their people.

7.

7.

Wealth in the poſſeſſion of individuals is a national or public reſource.

That part of the wealth of individuals which is exacted for national purpoſes is the public revenue.

Revenue may be proportioned to the numbers, wealth, and frugality, of a people.

It is levied by taxes.

Taxes are of four kinds.

Capitation, *Aſſeſſment*, *Cuſtoms*, and *Exciſe*.

Capitation is a tax impoſed on every individual, and falls equally on the poor and the rich.

Aſſeſſments are proportioned to the ſuppoſed ſtock in land, money, or goods.

Cuſtoms are a tax on goods in commerce.

Exciſe is a tax on conſumption.

Cuſtoms may be ſo levied as to direct or to limit commerce.

Exciſe has a tendency to limit conſumption, and affects either the quantity or the quality of goods conſumed.

8.

National force is proportioned to the reſources, diſcipline, and character of a people.

SECT. II.

Of GOVERNMENT.

1.

GOVERNMENT is founded on ſubordination.

Subordination is the relation in which men acting as a body are placed to each other

It is either caſual or inſtitutional.

2.

Caſual ſubordination is the mere diſtribution of rank, founded on *Fortune*, *Character*, and *Birth*.

3.

Inſtitutional ſubordination is the actual diſtribution of power.

Power is any part of the force of the ſtate, committed to the direction of certain perſons, for the performance of ſome public function.

Perſons intruſted with public functions are termed *Magiſtrates*.

Whoever is intruſted to perform, or to delegate every function of the ſtate, is the ſovereign, or ſupreme magiſtrate.

Public functions are of three kinds.

Legiſlation, *Juriſdiction*, and *Execution*.

4.

Legiſlation is the expreſſing of the will of the ſtate, for the future direction of its members.

Laws are either adopted from cuſtom, or enacted by ſtatute.

They refer either to the mode of ſubordination, to civil rights, or to the ſuppreſſion of crimes; and are ſaid to be *Political*, *Civil*, or *Criminal*.

Political laws define the relative rights of magiſtrate and ſubject.

Civil laws define the relative rights of private parties.

Criminal laws direct the proceedings of the magiſtrate in ſuppreſſing crimes.

5.

Juriſdiction is the interpretation of the will of the ſtate, and its application to particular caſes.

6.

Execution is the actual application of the public force, to defend the ſtate, or give effect to its laws.

Execution, relatively to the firſt object, ſhould be directed by the law of nations;

nations; relatively to the ſecond, by the municipal law of the country.

7.

The reſult of wiſe legiſlation, juriſdiction, and execution, is Public Liberty.

Liberty is the ſecurity of rights.

A conſtitution is ſaid to be free, when its forms are calculated to preſerve the rights of the ſubject.

Subjects are ſaid to be free, when they actually enjoy thoſe rights.

8.

The form of government is conſtituted by the manner in which the ſovereignty is exerciſed, by one, by ſelect numbers, or by the collective body.

The title of a ſovereign to rule is founded either in compact, or in that right which all parties have to do good to the utmoſt extent of their power.

9.

Governments are either *Simple* or *Mixed*.

Simple governments are thoſe under which ſovereignty is exerciſed by or in the name of ſome ſingle power.

They are of three kinds; *Republic*, *Monarchy*, and *Deſpotiſm*.

In republics the ſovereign power is exerciſed by numbers.

1*ſt*, By the collective body, as in democracy. Here men act on maxims of equality, and the ſtate is ſupported by the diſintereſted zeal of its members.

2*dly*, By a particular order, or ſelect number, as in ariſtocracy: Men are diſtinguiſhed into two claſſes, and the ſtate is ſupported by the ſteadineſs and moderation of the ſuperior order.

Monarchy is that in which a ſingle perſon exerciſes the ſovereignty according to fixt laws and inſtitutions.

There is a continued gradation of ranks; and the ſtate is ſupported by the

the regard of individuals for the maxims and honours of their ſtation.

Deſpotiſm is that in which a ſingle perſon governs by force, without any law or limitation. Subjects are held to be equal, except ſo far as the ſovereign is pleaſed to diſtinguiſh them by his temporary will. The ſtate is ſupported by the fear of puniſhment.

10.

Mixed governments are thoſe in which the ſovereignty is exerciſed in parts by a plurality of collateral powers, as *King*, *Nobles*, and *People*.

Men are ſeparated into different orders and claſſes; and the ſtate is ſupported by the balance of oppoſite intereſts and principles.

FINIS.

BRITISH LIBRARY
30
77
MAR